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Introduction
Boudon’s intellectual production is wide, complex and offers a quantity of original contributions. A 
main aspect of this author’s scientific work is the objectivist and anti relativist exploration on 
values, a deepening expressing the perception of fundamental analytical necessities and that, mainly 
through its implications on method and the same vision of social thought, sooner or later will 
greatly stimulate innovation. 
In modern complex societies, characterized by rapid changes in organizational and ethical 
foundations and a strong push toward globalization, it becomes more and more evident the 
necessity to overhaul the axiomatic basis and the genesis of judgement criteria with their 
implications, mainly the interaction with institutional order and  the transition of civilizations. In 
particular, it is pressing the need to solder, in the context of social integration, individual and 
collective behaviour to the exigency of rationality. Moreover, it is important to avoid cultural 
diffusion exogenously forced and to clarify in a stringent way the degenerative characters of some 
values, such as religious fundamentalism, tyrannies and totalitarian views that have claimed to 
regenerate man while are some true dead-ends.
The first section of this essay treats the present condition of the theory of values and dedicates 
some brief note to its role in social research. Section two amplifies such treatment and analyses 
Boudon’s position in that context, mainly expressed by his theory of objective values. Finally, 
section three treats the way to remedy some omissions that, in our opinion, limit the fecundity of 
Boudon’s proposals and that mainly refer to some axiomatic foundations on method. The essay 
ends with an exhortation to overcome, through science, the unfruitful contrast between voluntarists 
and the followers of spontaneous motion.
For space reasons, the paper dedicates only a quick analysis to some delicate questions that we
 diffusely treated in other studies on Boudon, sending back to them for a major deepening1. 
Keywords: Ethical values in social research; objective and subjective values; voluntary and 
spontaneity views; institutional order and civilizations; methodological ambiguities on values..   
1. The state of the studies on values
The investigation on values is largely characterized by the opposition between ‘cultural relativism’ 
and what may be called ‘absolutist relativism’. The meaning of the first expression is well known. 
The second one is referable to religious and fundamentalist thought and the term relativism intends 
to underline that faith precepts are ‘relative’ to the religions and philosophies that proclaim them. 
Boudon strongly argues against cultural relativism, while he forgets absolutist relativism, probably 
due to the thinking that this one does not pertain to science. We shall see, however, that the 
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consideration of absolutist relativism helps to shed light on cultural relativism. In fact, the two have 
a common root: the postulate that values cannot be scientifically explained, which is strongly 
opposed by Boudon and that displays a dominating role in social thought.
Cultural relativism attributes an equal dignity in principle to all values and civilizations. On the 
contrary, absolutist relativism is exclusivist; it implies, therefore, an uncompromising opposition 
among the various precepts of faith. Cultural relativism is flexible in nature and hence open to the 
variable exigencies of the changing world; but it is unable and reluctant to give indications on what 
to do. It intends its openness as synonymous of tolerance; but its denial of objective values does not 
allow to prove the objectivity of the value of tolerance that therefore remains an ethical precept 
among many others. On the contrary, absolutist relativism imperatively indicates, through the 
precepts of faith, what to believe and to do; this may give it some attraction in the presence of 
difficult and confused situations, mainly if afflicted by a profound crisis of values. But its stiffness 
may forcefully obstruct the development process through dogmatic prescriptions. Moreover, the 
contrasts among different precepts of faith strongly entangle, in the global world, the human 
relations and the capacity to collaborate with other people. Briefly, absolutist relativism inclines 
toward civilization conflicts and to suffocate the fecundating seeds provided by the variety of 
civilizations. Both the relativisms oppose the birth of a global ethics that the present world strongly 
needs.2 They symmetrically and clearly express the limits and implications of the postulate that 
values cannot have a scientific explanation and get a reciprocal support from their respective lacks.
For better developing the matter, some reference to M. Weber’s thought may be useful. This is 
mainly characterised by the famous distinction between the ‘ethics of conviction’ and the ‘ethics of 
responsibility’ implying an ethical dualism that legitimates the two-fold moral. But this is a minor 
lack. It is much more relevant the great Weber’s ambiguity on responsibility. The author 
substantially misses the crucial question of the object and content of responsibility: does this refer 
to self interest, the desire of glory, faith precepts, some generic notion of common good, or other? 
What was Ivan Terrible’s responsibility? Weber does not care to clarify these crucial questions. The 
consequent great indeterminateness of the notion of responsibility is much more devastating than 
the Weberian ethical dualism; it implies a multiplicity of ethics that, with the help of the double  
moral, allow a diffuse manipulating power on values. This does not trouble Weber as he is strongly 
convinced that values have a subjective character, are visions and just points of view. 
For better clarifying the present misunderstandings on ethics, it may be useful to remind the 
thinking that prevailed in the field some centuries before Weber. At the beginning of modern age, 
Roman Church abandoned Medieval rationalism, mainly as an effect of her harsh opposition to the 
methodological developments and achievements of natural sciences. This hostility to scientific 
thought was congenial to the idea that values are faith precepts. For their part, laic students derived, 
from the inconsistency of some religious dogma with modern dynamic society, the conviction that 
the expulsion of ethics from social thought was a methodological and practical necessity. 
Machiavelli illustrated with many examples that ethics has nothing to do with politics; A. Smith 
extended such teaching to economics. Mandeville went beyond: his statement that “private vices are 
public virtues” implies the exclusion of ethics from the whole social thought. All that was in 
accordance with the methods of inquiry of natural sciences, based on the strict observation of reality 
and characterised by the absence of prescriptive aspect. Unfortunately, this method is, as we shall 
see soon, not appropriate to social phenomena. 
The expulsion of ethics from social theory was useful to dupe the obstacle to modernity 
represented by what the secularization movement indicated as clerical obscurantism. Finally, at the 
beginning of last century, Pareto, Weber, Spengler, just to remember the most important names, 
intended to clarify and state through deep analyses and many historical references that values 
cannot receive a scientific explanation; this proposition greatly stimulated the irrationalism that 
afflicted human societies in the first half of the XX century. But the separation of ethics from the 
various branches of social thought is senseless; in fact, ethics represents an important (probably the 
most important) aspect of social reality and it is inseparable from political, economical and all 
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remaining aspects of social life. This groundless separation has perhaps given the main push to the 
diffusion of the idea that values cannot be scientifically explained, and hence to cultural and 
absolutist relativism. 
In our time, it appears more and more evident that the secularization movement, after having 
given an important stimulus to the development of Western countries by setting them free from 
absurd ethical precepts, must emend itself from the relativist methodological equivocations. For 
their part, religions should be made aware that the above equivocations on values prevent to clarify 
the relations between faith and reason and hence to syntonize religious teachings with modern 
world.
These ambiguities and misunderstandings afflicting social thought make Boudon’s innovative 
insistence on cultural objectivism a beneficial turning point that stimulates some accurate deepening 
and revisions on values.
2. Subjectivism and objectivism: Boudon’s contribution to the theory of values
This section will manage for making evident some main merits and omissions, in our opinion, of 
Boudon’s anti relativism. We shall pay particular attention to the question of rationality and, more 
in general, to some methodological impasse afflicting social thought. We agree with Boudon’s aim 
to conjugate reality and rationality, positive and normative aspects, tradition and modernity. 
Nevertheless, it seems to us that the link with Weberian thought damages these aims.
Weber’s ethical subjectivism is coherent with the idea that the explanation of reality must limit 
itself to consider this one as given and hence the object of strict observation. In fact, this positivist 
notion of science excludes normative (i.e ethical) aspect, just as he does. All the same, Boudon tries 
to maintain his objectivism and anti relativism in the Weberian track. In doing that, he stresses the 
question of rationality, that plays a crucial interpretative role in Weber’s thought. The reference to 
rationality is very important not only as a reaction to the diffuse irrationalism of social thinking but, 
in our opinion, also because it makes evident the great methodological weakness of social theory. It 
must be underlined, however, that Weber’s insistence on rationality is contradicted by his exclusion 
of values from scientific thought. Boudon does not undergo this contradiction being his objectivist 
effort directed to overcome it. But the ambiguous Weberian legacy on rationality displays in some 
other way its influence, mainly through two key notions at the heart of Boudon’s theoretical 
development: the Weberian notion of ‘behavioural cognitivism’ and that of ‘diffuse rationality’. 
The cognitivist statement that there are always some reasons at the basis of human action is 
certainly true. Unfortunately, this evidence teaches us very little on the rationality of individual 
behaviour. The reasons of human actions and decisions may include even foolishness. It seems to us 
that human action, being largely influenced by instincts and sometimes by morally questionable 
feelings, is a weak and deceiver expression of rational behaviour. Rationality must be referred to  
science; as such, it is tightly linked to the question of method, which is indispensable to put the 
problem in scientific terms3. Boudon objects to this criticism that rationality must be referred to 
individual social behaviour, i.e. aimed at being approved by the other, not to individual human 
behaviour. Moreover, it must be added that his notion of ‘ordinary rationality’ is a very general one, 
also including scientific rationality. But the point is that a main and urgent need of social thought is 
to extend as much as possible the role of scientific rationality at the expenses of the other 
components of ordinary rationality. In fact, those components may be highly misleading while the 
extension of the role of scientific rationality is strongly opposed, in social thought, by deep 
methodological equivocations. It is, therefore, absolutely indispensable to remove those 
equivocations. Some considerations on the other notion that our author derives from Weber’s 
teaching, i.e. the principle of ‘diffuse rationality’, clearly shows the heavy equivocations that may 
be associated to the non scientific components of rationality. Let see
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The notion of ‘diffuse rationality’ expresses the idea that in the very long run things adjust by 
themselves, through spontaneous trial ad error process. In this way, values would converge towards 
the ‘right ones’ and this would warrant them a scientific objectivity. Boudon’s statement that 
“contingency has caused values genesis and diffuse rationalisation their selection”, that gives an 
efficacious synthesis of his theory, is Darwinian. This landfall is not convincing and does not help 
daily life through science. It is undeniable that, notwithstanding disasters and catastrophes, the 
world is obliged to adjust in such a way to allow human species to survive till extinction, as 
experienced by other species that lived a much longer time than homo sapiens’ 30 thousand years. 
But man is the author of a growing social change, without comparison with the rare accidental 
mutations and slow selective processes characterizing natural world. For understanding the man’s 
work of transformation, it is not enough (and may cause growing equivocations with the 
acceleration of social evolution) some ex post judgment, as implied by the assumption of 
spontaneity of changes. In sum, with reference to the analysis of man’s construction, it is not 
sufficient to observe what happened; the research must also concern the way to build social reality 
and set out a science helping this task. Weber is strongly aware of the non repetitive character of 
social phenomena. But he does not consider that this non repetition, which implies a great 
difference between social and natural reality, makes the positivist method inappropriate to the first. 
The principle of ‘diffuse rationality’ is the tool he uses to prove that the observed behaviours are 
rational. 
To sum up, even if the principle of  ‘diffuse rationality’ reconciles reality and rationality, just as 
Boudon is aimed at doing, it derives this reconciliation from Darwinian selection. But it seems to us 
that this rationality based on spontaneous facts, their observation and the acceptation of what 
happened cannot give a science of social relations, these being determined by human voluntarist 
action.
In effect, even the science of nature largely by passed the principle of diffuse rationality at the  
beginning of modern age, when some clear methodological procedure and rules were set out. 
Before F. Bacon and Galileo’s revolution, technologic and natural knowledge grew according to the 
above principle: a slow selection of fecund intuitions that often stagnated for a long time in a sort of 
incubation or got lost and were accidentally rediscovered.4 In the absence of a scientific procedure 
of research and discovery, knowledge advanced slowly and with difficulty across millennia. The 
discovery, in XIV and XVII centuries, of a method well appropriate to natural reality made 
exponential the knowledge in the field.
This critical frame can usefully add some reference to two sociologists greatly appreciated by 
Boudon: E. Durkeim and A. Tocqueville. Our author resumes from Durkeim a notion that strongly 
weaknesses the question of method and, in a sense, is coherent with the principle of diffuse 
rationality: the assimilation of scientific research to enchantment in the context of the notion of 
‘ordinary rationality’. But even if it is indubitable that the progress of knowledge is, in any case, a 
result of trial and error, as a consequence of the limits of human skills, it must be underlined that 
science qualitatively differs from enchantment. Science needs the capacity to compare and select 
theories on the basis of their contribution to the advancement of knowledge; such capacity requires 
the sharing, across the scientific community, of basic methodological rules allowing the dialogue 
among students5. The parallelism between science and enchantment may induce to intend as 
physiological a main drama of social theory: the growing plurality of schools of thought unable to 
interact each other and hold a dialogue. Moreover, Boudon takes from Durkeim, as a foundation of 
individualism, the statement that individual has always had a deep feeling of his dignity and 
interests: an unquestionable statement, but that says very little on interests and dignity since these 
largely vary with individuals and across civilizations; it seems, therefore, unable to provide values 
and value judgments with an objective foundation.  
Boudon also reminds Tocqueville’s statement that “future is an illuminated and high minded 
judge but always arriving too late”. Yes, too late. Man cannot be satisfied with this tardy judgement 
only able to motivate regret. He must attempt to acquire the skill to judge in advance his building 
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and transformations of social reality, instead of confining himself to ex post judgements, as implied 
by the principle of diffuse rationality. Tocqueville was an acute observer and developed some 
precious comparative analyses of important social orders. Unfortunately, comparative analyses only 
consider being and hence give, as we said, tardy judgements on what happened. It is certainly true 
that comparison may provide useful teachings and represents the highest level of understanding that 
strict observation can allow in the social sciences; but it is inadequate to supply suggestions on what 
to do. Frankly, it seems to us that Boudon professes too much appreciation for Durkein, Tocqueville 
and Weber’s teachings.
Social thought is today in a condition that does not differ from that of technologic and natural 
thinking before Galileo; it proceeds according to ‘diffuse rationality’ and hence very slowly; in 
addition, such kind of rationality is deeply disturbed, in social life, by mystifications on values 
mainly due to dominating interests, much more than these influenced pre modern technologic 
process. The present acceleration of social change, largely as an effect of the growing knowledge on 
nature, makes untenable this situation and may open the door to disaster. A main necessity of our 
time is to allow also social thought to grow exponentially, that is select the real contributions to 
knowledge and give full value to them through a method appropriate to the investigated reality. This 
aspiration is not exaggerated; in fact, social reality is, under various aspects, easier to understand 
than the natural one since it is a reality generated by man and hence more understandable than 
natural phenomena. Unfortunately, a wide and powerful coalition opposes the scientific 
development of social thought. It is not limited to positivism. Weberian diffuse rationality and 
idealism, both based on the idea that real means rational, agree with the positivist assumption of the 
spontaneity of processes.6 This coalition has been strengthened by the confluence of Roman Church 
and other religions that point out the reasonableness, wisdom and good sense warranted to religious 
doctrines by long lasting elaborations across centuries, just as the principle of diffuse rationality 
maintains. This is, in effect, the basic weakness of the idea of world ethics expressed by the 
Chicago Declaration
Boudon rightly opposes to relativists that values have their reasons. But the statement that 
spontaneous behaviour push, in Darwinian sense, values toward the right ones leaves unsolved the 
following important question: is it necessary to accept values as they are, putting each of them on 
the same plan in principle, as relativists do? or does it need, on the contrary, to manage for deriving 
some criteria allowing to capture the right values in the vortex of spontaneous processes? It seems 
to us that the second option is nearest than the first to Boudon’s aims; but it raises some delicate 
methodological problems that are absent in the analysis of this author.    
3. Some ideas and suggestions on the establishment of ethical objectivism
It may be useful to investigate the way to better carry into effect Boudon’s purposes, previously 
underlined. Differently from this author, we do not make the distinction between cultural and 
cognitive relativism, being the problem of the method, at the heart of the second term of that 
distinction, crucial for the criticism of cultural relativism.
The fathers of sociology neglected the key problem and the need of a method of inquiry 
appropriate to social reality. They were misled, in various ways, by naturalist positivism and 
evolutionary spontaneism. But, as we said, an important difference distinguishes natural from social 
reality. The first is given for students; it expresses being and therefore must be investigated such it 
is or, in other words, as the product of spontaneous behaviour the reason of which is senseless to 
analyse as the essentialist vainly pretended to do. On the contrary, social reality is a product of 
human work; this makes possible and sensible to investigate the reasons of its features. In sum, 
social reality cannot be merely understood as being, since it is for a large part marked by doing. It  
follows that the method of inquiry on social reality must care to combine being and doing. Boudon 
expresses this exigency when he points out the necessity to reconcile positive and normative 
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aspects, but he does not consider the methodological implications. It seems evident, however, that 
the combination of being and doing is an obliged way for the derivation of scientific values and 
puts the ethical aspect at the centre stage of the methodological procedure and rules. The disregard 
of this development on method obliges to found the objectivity of values on the principle of diffuse 
rationality, which is inherently hostile to the possibility of governing human society. Let see better.
As we noted, the principle of diffuse rationality sets out the idea of spontaneous Darwinian 
gravitation towards organizational necessities of social systems. But the fact that the evolution of 
social organization is the product of man, not a consequence of accidental mutations, makes 
immediately evident the possibility and the need to clarify those ‘necessities’, so that to may 
knowingly direct toward them. However, it is important to take present that, in the life of social 
systems, not all is ‘necessity’. It follows that the analysis of social phenomena needs a basic 
distinction between:
1. The aspect of ‘necessity’, that is, concerning what must be done in some fairly  
determined ways, due to precise features of human nature, other conditions of nature and the  
character of the general conditions of development marking the various development stages  
of human societies; in effect, this is the substance of the derivation of objective, that is, 
necessary values and hence not liable of free choice. 
2. The aspect of ‘choice-possibility-creativeness’, expressing subjective values, 
institutions, etc. that are the object of choice and political mediation and often are nourished 
by creativity with its unforeseeable character. Of course, choices must be mutually consistent 
and need coherence in deriving their implications. 
It seems important to stress that the definition of ‘necessity’ should be based on a  
methodological procedure and rules that, starting from realistic postulates concerning important  
aspect of the nature and the general conditions of development, lead to deduct their implications (in  
terms of institutional and ethical necessities) that an efficient and sagacious organization of human 
societies should not disregard. It must be noted, for clearness, that the above statement implies that 
choice-possibility must not contrast necessity and hence objective values, since all implications 
must be coherently derived from them.
The suggested procedure tightly combines reality (realistic postulates) and rationality (coherent 
derivation, from those postulates, of all implications in terms of values, etc.); just as Boudon 
proposes. Moreover, the procedure also meets well another main exigency that our author 
underlines: the reconciliation between modernity and tradition. In fact, this is implied by the 
necessity to take into account and do not violate the general conditions of development, that are 
long lasting, not at the mercy of social change.
Some basic characters of human nature allow to derive “ontological imperatives”, that is 
organizational and ethical forms indispensable to the expression of human evolutionary potential. 
Besides, from the general conditions of development we can derive “functional imperatives”7, that 
is, institutional and ethical forms imposed by reasons of organizational coherence and efficiency of  
social systems. Ontological imperatives, notwithstanding their great importance, do not represent 
inescapable necessities; they can be trampled over centuries, as happened in all ancient societies 
and with a special firmness in some great civilizations. Therefore, ontological imperatives do not  
follow the principle of diffuse rationality. On the contrary, functional imperatives, as dictated by 
reasons of organizational efficiency and coherence, oblige societies to gravitate toward them 
through trial and error if man ignores them, exactly as the principle of diffuse rationality maintains.
It could be objected that, if the advent of functional imperatives is warranted by spontaneous 
gravitation, their preventive knowledge, on which we insist, is practically irrelevant. But let us 
repeat that such knowledge is essential for avoiding the great sufferings that a spontaneous 
gravitation can inflict, and usually inflicts, to man. If social thought had clarified betimes that real 
socialism, self proclaimed  ‘scientific’, represented a social organization appropriate to stationary 
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societies, a lot of countries would have escaped the great suffering inflicted to them by the birth, life 
and death of those social systems that affirmed to be the road toward Future (and fascinated many 
people even in Western countries) while, on the contrary, were real dead-ends.
Some example may be useful to clarify these abstract formulations. The limitation of cognitive 
skills is a general feature of human nature and implies that a full unfolding of human potentialities 
requires attention for the opinions and contributions of all people, to select among them those really 
profitable. Therefore, the advancement of human knowledge and realizations requires to give 
importance to individual differences. If all men had identical skills these, even if very high, would 
be much lower than those deriving from the sum of a lot of skills strongly differentiated. It follows 
that the respect of human person and tolerance are indispensable to the operation of human 
evolutionary potentialities, what makes them ontological imperatives. This explanation of the value 
of individuality seems more general and pertinent than an explanation of individualism derived 
from Durkeim’s reference to the general sentiment, over time, of human dignity and interests. In 
fact, that sentiment can be dictated by closed civilizations that suffocate individual and condemn 
society to a total immobility. The two above ethical principles and ontological imperatives have 
been ignored for very long historical periods and in the most evident way by ancient and recent 
great centralised empires, that consequently finished in a dead-end. In the modern dynamic society,  
the beginning of which was promoted in Western Medieval Europe by very special historical  
coincidences, the above ontological imperatives also became functional imperatives, being their  
fulfilment strictly required by the existence of this kind of society; they were made indispensable by  
the new general conditions of development.
The synthesized methodological categories seem to provide with a useful tool for the 
interpretation of social processes and history. Historical road is pushed or obstructed by the respect  
or denial of ontological imperatives; besides, it is forced to gravitate towards functional  
imperatives. Moreover, civilizations, representing the main aspect of ‘choice-possibility’, must be 
consistent with functional imperatives, to avoid heavy inefficiencies and contradictions; this implies 
that the changes in functional imperatives across historical stages, dictated by the variations of the 
general conditions of development, will oblige civilizations to change, so that to restore the 
consistency with functional imperatives. It emerges, therefore, a causal chain going from 
ontological imperatives to functional imperatives, to civilizations, with the choice of civilizations  
open to creativity fuelling the whole process.
The above notions seem to be useful not only to the interpretation of the past. They may also 
explain, through the durableness of functional and ontological imperatives, some aspects of what 
will happen, One way to show their usefulness can be a comparison with other theoretical 
distinctions, for instance, the Marxian one between structure and superstructure that has allowed 
important contribution to the interpretation of capitalism notwithstanding the equivocal character 
that such distinction derived from its idealistic roots and expressed, in particular, by the ambiguous 
mixing between ‘necessity’ and ‘choice-possibility’8, which T. Parsons replicated in a different 
theoretical context. 
Conclusion
The synthesized methodological approach insists on ex ante rationality, as stronger and more 
enlightening for the understanding of social systems than the ex post rationality expressed by the 
Weberian principle of diffuse rationality. The approach also distinguishes objective and subjective-
relative values, thus avoiding to make the error and levity of intending the last as objective ones; in 
fact, the above distinction is not possible if we rely upon the spontaneist objectivity of what 
happened. Our development on method makes it evident that it is mistaken to discuss values, that 
concern doing, on the base of the mere observation of being as the principle of diffuse rationality 
does. In effect, there exists a great difference between the Darwinian tendency towards rationality, 
based on evolutionary struggle, and the skill of operating with rationality. This skill needs some 
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methodological procedure and rules appropriate to the basic character of social reality, that is a 
reality generated by human action and hence intertwining evolutionary and constructive aspects. 
Social reality is deeply ploughed by doing. The attempt to derive values simply through its 
observation is contradictory since this erases from method the role of doing.
In our opinion, it is a great merit of Boudon’s objectivism and anti relativism to imply, from a 
logical point of view, the above exigencies of deepening on method; and it is a students’ duty to 
bring on the scene and develop them. The great importance of the matter and the dominating 
opposition to cultural objectivism suggest to the defenders of this line of thought to develop a 
common and profound reflection on the methodological problems that it implies, postponing the 
contrasts of vision between spontaneists and constructivists to the reasons and needs of science. 
This is indispensable not only to demolish the reasons of the supporters of cultural relativism and 
absolutist dogmatism, but also for opposing convincing arguments to the notion and analysis of 
values implied by evolutionary spontaneism, idealism and the idea of ‘reasonableness’ of ancient 
values, typical of religions. It is our opinion that a deep confrontation of different objectivist 
approaches should allow some important theoretical advancement. The Groupe d’étude des methods 
de l’analyse sociologique (GEMAS), that has very much benefited Boudon’s stirring impulse, 
should profitably direct a part of his research toward the questions here considered; this seems 
indispensable to give full value and accomplish the insistence on values objectivity of the author 
whose festschrift we celebrate.  
Notes
8
1 See, in particular, A. Fusari (2007a), (2007b) and (2007c)
2  It must be recognized, however, that the Chicago declaration of 1993 by some religions and 
religious movements has represented the only endeavour to set up a global ethics. Unfortunately, this 
attempt intends to build a world ethics on some moral precepts present in various religions, 
irrespectively of the assessment of their scientific foundation, i.e. the appropriateness to the basic 
character of reality. The same limiting idea is at the basis of the research on values promoted by the 
United Nations the results of which were published on a document entitled ‘Crossing the divide;  
dialogue among civilizations’ (2001). This point will be better clarified in section 2 that discusses the 
principle of ‘diffuse rationality’. 
3  Le Roy Ladurie explained the Languedoc look-out for witches in XVI century through false beliefs 
and mass raving. Skinner replied that it is possible to adopt a false belief in a rational way. This 
dispute can be solved only by referring rationality to science.
4 It would be interesting an history of pre modern science based on such view.
5  J. Schumpeter wrote that only by accepting the term of ‘science’ as indicating any area of knowledge 
utilizing specialised techniques and staffs, it is possible, in principle, to include enchantment in 
science, since the first uses techniques that are in general not accessible and transmitted in the context 
of a circle of professional sorcerers.
6  Liberal doctrine is consistent with this attitude that distrusts voluntarism. But the idealist 
identification of reality with reason has deprived the variegated group of the heirs of idealism of the 
skill to manage social reality, condemning them to clamorous failures in the cases they have 
conquered political power and attempted to carry out revolutionary experiments. 
7  But not in the sense of T. Parsons’ imperatives, that ambiguously mixe necessity and choice-
possibility
8 See A. Fusari (1996)
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